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In recent years, there has been sustained academic and political scrutiny of externally-located ‘kinsfolk’: 
that is, groups of individuals located outside of a nominally national ‘kin-state’, and over whom the state in 
question lays claim to various forms of symbolic and/or legal jurisdiction. Academically, this literature is often 
nestled within broader, critical discussion of contemporary nations and nationalisms (Agarin and Karolewski 
2015), with scholars noting ‘the increasingly transnational character of global migration flows, cultural networks 
and socio-political practices’ (Smith and Bakker 2008, p. 3). Often premised on the assumption that globalisation 
has the capacity to erode traditional borders, these transnational developments have spurned significant research 
interest into kin-state policies across the globe. These policies are typically enacted by states to construct diasporic 
identities that create strong identificational bonds between co-ethnics and their supposedly external homeland 
(Stjepanović 2015, p. 144). The kinsfolk question is consequently salient for the foreign policy actions of self-
designating external homelands, but can also be heavily securitised by states that house groups of individuals who 
have the potential to be ‘diasporised’.  
Owing to the scale of its potentially diasporic kinspeople, the Russian Federation stands out globally as 
a significant agent of kin-state nationalism. Indeed, in recent years the Russian authorities have directed 
substantial resources towards kin-state activities, even codifying Russian-speaking ‘compatriots’ as central 
elements of the country’s assertive foreign policy (Grigas 2016, pp. 57-93). While much has been written on 
Russia’s politicisation of Russian speakers in its so-called ‘near abroad’ the articles of this volume place greater 
emphasis on the exploration of trends within the various communities of Russian speakers themselves. In this 
endeavour, we are influenced by Rogers Brubaker, who admonishes us to think of a diaspora as ‘a category of 
practice… used to make claims’; diaspora, he goes on to say ‘does not so much describe the world as seek 
to remake it’ (Brubaker 2005, p. 12). This special issue consequently investigates trends in how ‘Russian 
speakers’, located outside of Russia, respond to Russia’s kin-state policies and diasporising practices. In other 
words, we do not assume the existence of Russian-speaking and/or diasporic identities, or even strong group 
identities of any ilk. Instead, this collection presents a series of empirically-grounded studies into the lived realities 
of Russophone communities and individuals across a number of former Soviet states.    
In this article, and indeed in the wider special issue that we introduce, we argue that there is genuine 
academic merit in the study of ‘Russian speakers’, despite acknowledging the potential for this group to be reified 
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as a unit of analysis. Surveying developments in the former Soviet Union (FSU), we propose a framework that 
can help to study Russian speakers and Russian-speaking identities, whilst simultaneously capturing the 
complexities of their diverse experiences. In order to do this, we draw upon the theoretical literature on borders 
and boundaries to explore contemporary identity dynamics among Russian speakers living outside of Russia. Our 
framework, which articulates several internal and external boundaries that align with major identity cleavages in 
the region, is intended to help study existing trends and to allow scholars to pay close attention to external and 
internal factors, while being sensitive to the intersectional, messy and liminal factors that defy such neat binary 
categorisation. By allowing for diversity of experience, while simultaneously capturing commonalities, our 
framework facilitates fruitful comparative as well as in-depth single case analysis.  
As such, we examine official Russian policy toward these groups of individuals, paying close attention 
to the articulated vision of a ‘Russian World’ that is culturally rather than territorially defined. This allows 
consideration of how the disconnect between geographic borders and potential identity boundaries impacts 
political and social relations in the region. By offering a variegated, non-linear perspective on Russian speakers, 
our framework is used to conceptualise and compare different trends within key FSU states. While this framework, 
and the specific case studies included in this special issue, focus on ‘Russian speakers’, our insights also have 
relevance to the study of a wide range of potentially diasporic identities, kin-state nationalisms, and minority 
politics in areas that experience complex intersections between ‘external homelands’, ‘nationalising states’, 
‘national minorities’ and ‘international organisations’ (Smith 2002).  
Russian speakers as a unit of analysis 
Significantly, right from the establishment of the new Russian state in late 1991, there was 
understandably high interest in the ‘new Russian diaspora’ (Shlapentokh et al. 1994): the 25 million ethnic 
Russians who found themselves ‘beached’ (Laitin 1998, p. 29) by the sudden retraction of the Soviet borders, and 
who were now resident in fourteen newly-constituted national states outside of Russia. Early research clamoured 
to answer two fundamental questions, focusing on the external and internal dimensions of these groups’ existence. 
The external question pertained to their relationship with an ‘external homeland’: Russia. Internally, scholars 
assessed the likelihood of ethnic violence in states with large ‘Russian’ populations, while also attempting to 
anticipate their future prospects for social and political integration within these states.  
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Two and a half decades on from these seismic developments, despite pockets of militant activism and 
tension, there has been a quantifiable lack of ethnic violence associated with (or perpetrated against) Russian-
speaking populations. This has understandably supressed academic interest in the second question, 
notwithstanding renewed attention in the wake of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. The first question, 
however, has been fraught by significant political, social, socio-economic and ideational variance across the 
political realities of the Soviet successor states. Even more problematic, from a conceptual point of view, is the 
inevitable diversity between groups of people who are referred to variously (often interchangeably) as (ethnic) 
Russians, Russian speakers and Russophones.  
This richness of difference poses serious questions concerning the usefulness and validity of constructing 
a workable and robust research framework for the study of Russian-speaking identities outside of Russia. Here, 
and throughout this special issue, we acknowledge the inherent danger of reproducing group labels in an 
essentialising fashion. ‘Russian speakers’, we admit, is a potentially constraining, catch-all term that does not do 
justice to the great heterogeneity within this group (a heterogeneity to which the articles of this volume attest). 
Nevertheless, despite significant differences within and among diverse groups of Russian speakers (i.e., people 
who speak Russian as a first language), it is our contention that two major factors provide anchorage for 
comparative and conceptual research of this diverse group.  
The first dynamic was Russian speakers’ shared, simultaneous emergence as ‘beached diasporas’ (Laitin 
1998, p.29) within newly-constituted national states after the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union. The presence 
of 25 million ethnic Russians (as defined by rigid, Soviet practices of recording ethnicity) outside of the Russian 
Federation naturally spurned much research into the identities of Russians outside of Russia (for example, Melvin 
1995; Laitin 1998). Admittedly, despite this common starting point, this earlier body of research highlighted the 
diverging identity trajectories of diasporic identities in Russia’s ‘near abroad’, both within individual states and 
across the vastly diverse territories of the former Soviet space. This led most researchers to note observable 
ruptures in common identities between ‘diasporic communities’ and citizens of the Russian Federation. Pal Kolstø 
(1996, p. 611), for example, confidently talked of a Russian diaspora, separate from the ‘core group’ of Russians 
in Russia, before preferring to conceptualise ‘fourteen different diasporas’ in the post-Soviet states outside of 
Russia ‘each with their own peculiar characteristics’ (Kolstø 1999, p. 616). 
Significantly, fears of mobilisation of Russian minority groups proved largely unfounded, with 
‘Yugoslav scenarios’ failing to emerge in the post-Soviet space. Indeed, ethnicity arguably became less salient as 
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ethnic heterogeneity within Russophone communities presented obstacles to political and social mobilisation 
(Zevelev 2008, p. 57). As time progressed, research consequently often focused on ‘Russian speakers’ rather than 
ethnic Russians (Birka 2016), especially in the context of the Baltic states. David Laitin (1998) even argued that 
a Russian-speaking ‘nationality’ was steadily emerging, with language replacing ethnicity as the most salient 
marker of group identity. In the Baltic states, where strict language laws have been introduced to restrict the public 
use of Russian, this linguistic identification has been used to link various Russian-speaking groups together under 
a shared discourse of language discrimination (Cheskin 2016, pp.71-3). At the same time, as evidenced by Kulyk’s 
and Bureiko and Moga’s contributions to this volume, Ukraine has latterly seen a clear shift away from group 
identities that coalesce around language practices. Likewise, survey data collected by Lowell Barrington (2001) 
in Kazakhstan and Ukraine highlighted only limited support for the claim of the emergence of a Russian-speaking 
identity let alone ‘nationality’.   
There are therefore numerous centrifugal factors that complicate comparative research into ‘Russian 
speakers’ in the post-Soviet space, with some justified debate as to whether this term is an appropriate unit of 
analysis at all. However, the similar starting point allows us to view the processes of convergence and divergence 
through a comparative lens. In other words, the process of divergence itself is a worthy topic of investigation; it 
is important to examine why different, generalised trends in language use, self-identification and group 
identification are occurring across the post-Soviet space. If, as the extant research suggests, Russian-speaking 
identities are stronger in Latvia and Estonia than in Ukraine and Kazakhstan, it is important to understand why 
this is the case.   
A second dynamic provides some potential for the consolidation of Russian/Russian speaking group 
identities within the region. Despite the diffuse nature of Russian speaking and/or ethnic Russian identities (even 
within single states), Russia has recently sought to articulate and pursue a coherent policy towards the group of 
individuals it increasingly refers to as ‘Russian compatriots’ (rossiiskie sootechestvenniki). While Russophone 
groups are noted for their internal ethnic, national, social and economic diversity, recent efforts have been made 
to broaden the definitional and legal designation of compatriots. This has allowed the Russian state to claim to be 
the guardian of the rights of Russian speakers, even outside of its legal territorial borders. The most notable and 
extreme manifestation of this was Russia’s intervention in Crimea, which was directly justified as a measure to 
protect the rights of Russian speakers (Putin 2014).  
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The compatriot policies of the Russian state should be treated critically; they are discursive practices 
aimed at creating and maintaining group boundaries rather than a necessary reflection of actual group boundaries. 
Nevertheless, these practices cannot be ignored. Not only do they create a discursive basis for people potentially 
to associate themselves as Russian compatriots, they also have potential to stimulate counter-reactions from within 
states that house large numbers of Russian speakers (Schulze 2016). Research is therefore necessary in order to 
determine the ways that various sides react to, and participate in, discursive attempts to articulate Russian-
speaking group identities.  
While these two dynamics ensure that ‘Russian speakers’ are a potentially fruitful object of study, it is 
nonetheless already apparent that the complexity of various overlapping trends demands careful consideration. 
Russian-speaking identities appear to be subject to competing bordering and diasporising practices, whereby 
various actors vie to define who Russian speakers are, where they rightfully belong, and what characteristics 
define them. This takes place along a variety of linguistic, spatial, national, social, historical and economic axes. 
Significantly, these practices emanate from a range of different political, economic, social and cultural arenas, 
which, in turn, can be conceptualised as internally, externally and liminally enacted. In order to make sense of 
these intricate realities, we consequently turn to theories of borders and bordering. This approach, we argue, helps 
to avoid ‘groupism’ (Brubaker 1998) by focusing not on what a given group is, but on the processes whereby 
group identities are operationalised and how they work (Brubaker 2009, p.29). 
Borders and Symbolic Boundaries 
There is a rich multidisciplinary literature on borders and boundaries that, despite disciplinary differences 
in focus, shares common concepts. Traditional approaches in political geography focus on the demarcation process 
and the resulting divisions (Newman 2006, p. 3) and see the purpose of the boundary to divide populations and, 
in so doing, distinguish the insiders from the outsiders (Donnan and Wilson 1999, p. 48).  European integration 
and economic globalization, however, have sparked interest in the process of opening borders with the goal of 
transforming barriers into bridges and fostering cooperation (Newman 2006, p. 3). The resulting increase in 
transnationalism, despite persistent even increasing salience of ethnic, national and regional identities, has led to 
greater scholarly attention to social and other non-territorially defined boundaries (Anderson and O’Dowd, p. 
602).  
All of these dynamics in border regions, including contested boundaries, have led to significant 
multidisciplinary research on what might be termed political landscapes, borderlands, or border regions. Focusing 
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on the relationship between geographic boundaries, culture and identity, this literature examines the interactions, 
acts of inclusion and exclusion that occur among the populations living in proximity to both sides of physical 
borders. Historians have been drawn to analyse centrifugal and centripetal forces at play in what they term 
borderlands, where local populations feel pushed away from their national centre and also pulled towards the 
borderland inhabitants on the other side of the geographic boundary, who similarly are pushed away from their 
respective centre (Donnan and Wilson 1999, p. 48). In this sense, peoples on both sides of the geographic border 
may share common cultural identity traits, which conflicts with traditional views on the convergence of state and 
nation. Political scientists have in fact explored distinct identities among the inhabitants of what they term border 
regions, which also challenges the “precise and once presumed fit between nation, state and territory” (Donnan 
and Wilson, 1999, p. 53).  
Social boundaries as a concept augment traditional geographic approaches. They include the social and 
symbolic factors that are associated with the dividing lines on a map (Migdal 2004, p. 5).  Borders and boundaries 
in this expanded conceptualization therefore carry both material and symbolic meaning. They exist in an objective 
sense, as lines on a map that physically delineate group belonging, but also are the result of an inter-subjective 
‘bordering’ process that constructs symbolic boundaries to distinguish between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and provide the 
basis for group identity (Newman 2006, p. 5; Zhurzhenko 2010, p. 156). Empirical studies establish that, in some 
cases, the cultural boundary may have greater salience than the geographic one in terms of separation and 
exclusion. For example, research conducted in Ireland found that Irish citizens living in the Republic saw 
themselves as both the same and different from their kin in the North. While they had a shared a sense of being 
Irish, their sense of self was tied to a culture of civility, tolerance and openness that they could not reconcile with 
the violence in the North (Todd 2006).  
The process of bordering unfolds both in the objective sense as the physical landscape is demarcated, but 
also in the symbolic sense as the criteria for inclusion and exclusion is determined (Newman 2006, p. 6). Further, 
in order to have objective meaning, borders must be ‘drawn in the minds of the people’ and are in this sense 
discursively constructed as part of state and nation building (Zhurzhenko 2010, p. 155). These resulting ‘soft 
borders’ are narrative constructs that emerge from governmental and civil society efforts to ‘make sense of’ the 
border (Zhurzhenko 2010, p. 158) which is essential for the legitimization and naturalization of the ‘hard borders’ 
that are legally delineated and institutionally maintained (Zhurzhenko 2010, p. 156). Bordering processes are 
relational and thus rely both upon internal definitions of self and external affirmation. That is, not only must group 
members define the membership criteria for belonging, but this ‘process must be recognized by outsiders for an 
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objectified collective identity to emerge’ (Lamont and Molnar 2002, p. 170).  For this reason, scholars view the 
delineation and maintenance of identity boundaries as one of the processes fundamental to contentious politics 
(McAdam et al 2001).  
As narrative constructs, soft borders and social and symbolic boundaries may also be understood as 
‘manifestations of socio-spatial consciousness’ (Passi 1995, p. 43) such that collective identity associated with 
territory may outlast the physical border itself. Thus, changes in geographic borders do not necessarily eliminate 
ethno-linguistic affiliation (Newman 2006, p.5), leading to incongruence between geographic borders and identity 
boundaries.  Indeed, ‘symbolic boundaries of identity and culture [which} make nations and states two very 
different entities’ (Lamont and Molnar 2002, p. 183).  
The identity boundaries themselves, most importantly, may not be the same for each group (Kachuyevski 
and Olesker 2014). That is, groups may not see the boundary in the same terms- they may not agree on how groups 
are separated. In divided societies, where the national identity itself is contested (who is a legitimate part of ‘us’?) 
the majority may see the minority as part of an outside ‘other’ even if the minority does not share this perception. 
Or, the minority itself may identify as part of the ‘other’ (Kachuyevski and Olesker 2014, 308), both of which 
result in a boundary that resembles the letter ‘L’. Yet, perceived boundaries may make room for greater diversity 
if either the minority or the majority (or both) may identify the minority as distinct from both the majority and 
their ethnic kin in neighbouring states, resulting in a boundary that resembles the letter ‘T’. Conflict is more likely 
in cases where the minority and majority do not agree on which boundary exists, or when both accept the ‘L’ 
formation.  
 
 
INSERT FIGURE ONE HERE 
Figure 1: ‘L’ Boundary and ‘T’ Boundary in Divided Societies (reprinted with permission from the 
International Journal of Conflict Management). 
 
 
This ‘disconnect’ in boundary perception can lead to social and political conflict as geographic 
boundaries do not match identity boundaries, and as different actors do not agree on where the identity boundaries 
lie. Because boundaries mark ‘the site where different ways of doing things meet, they are likely to be replete 
with tension and conflict’ (Migdal 2004, p. 6) and, further ‘borders need to be constantly maintained and socially 
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reproduced through particular practices and discourses which emphasize “the other”, itself a source of conflict’ 
(Anderson 1999, p. 598). Thus boundary regions have greater potential for conflict, yet also the possibility for 
cooperation if contested areas can be transformed (Passi 1995, p. 45). Further, inhabitants of borderlands may 
have more fluid identities that result not in a weak overall sense of identity, but rather encompass more dynamic 
and nuanced processes of self identification in which the lines between different categories are blurred and diffuse 
(Zaharchenko 2016, pp. 41-54). This could contribute to a possible ‘porous’ nature of constructed boundaries 
since blurred lines of distinction render boundaries more negotiable.  
The literature on borders and boundaries offers useful conceptual tools with which we can analyse social 
and political dynamics among Russia, neighbouring states and the Russian speakers who reside in these states, 
and helps flesh out the implications of the clash between ‘nationalising’ policies and political realities in the post-
Soviet space. Below we explore the factors central to current contentious politics in this region, namely the 
political and cultural status, or rights, of Russian speakers within their respective states of residence, and the role 
of Russia as a self-purported cultural ‘homeland’ with distinctive responsibilities.  
Russia’s bordering practices 
The 2010 amendments to Russia’s Compatriot Law (see Kozin 2015) facilitate a wide range of cultural, 
historical and ethnic axes for individuals to claim (or Russia to assert) compatriot status. Now, all that was needed 
was a ‘spiritual connection’ to Russia and ancestral links to one of Russia’s 185 national groups or to one of the 
numerous nationalities of the Russian empire (Grigas 2016, p. 89). This development should be seen in the context 
of Russia’s bordering practices, whereby the Russian state has unilaterally sought to redefine the physical and 
symbolic boundaries of Russianness, and even the Russian nation.  
Such bordering practices seek to overcome patterns of cultural, ethnic, territorial and social diversity 
through the bridging and hybridisation of the ‘two faces of Russianness’ (Kosmarskaya 2005, p. 268), i.e. civic 
and ethnic understandings (demarcated by politico-territorial and ethno-cultural borders respectively). In the early 
- mid 1990s, President El’tsin attempted to promote a civic (rossiiskii) identity, asserting that the Soviet successor 
states were best placed to look after their resident Russian-speaking populations. The political border of the 
Russian Federation was therefore held as a physical, as well as symbolic, border between actual, political Russia 
and its various historical, ethno-cultural incarnations. El’tsin’s initiative, however, was soon challenged by radical 
national groups, as well as the electorally-popular Communists and the far-right Liberal Democratic Party of 
Russia. These groups demanded a more assertive policy towards ethnic Russians and largely rejected El’tsin’s 
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search for a new, civic Russian idea that they instead linked with the pernicious effects of western liberalism 
(Laruelle 2015). 
Tsygankov (2013, p. 20) has referred to Putin’s presidencies in terms of a ‘mixed-identity coalition’, 
seeking to pacify the demands of competing groups of ‘westernisers’ and ethnocentric nationalists within a 
generally statist programme. This has allowed Putin to take an ‘ethno-selective’ (Kosmarskaya 2011, p. 54) 
approach to the imagined diaspora, at once highlighting this group’s civic and ethnic core features. Cheskin (2016, 
p. 174) has characterised Putin’s deliberate and selective conflation of ethnic and civic ‘Russianness’ as the 
‘Rossiisification’ (i.e., not simply the ethnic ‘Russification’) of Russian compatriots. In other words, Russian 
speakers are not merely presented as co-ethnics. Instead, Russia’s compatriot policies and discourses are often 
bound in civic and institutional parameters, even when compatriots are implicitly conceptualised in ethnic terms 
(Laruelle 2015, 14). This allows the Russian state to lay institutional and extraterritorial claim to their ‘compatriots 
abroad’, even in cases where they are not ethnically Russian.  
This speaks to the blurring of previously-established borders of Russian identities. Simultaneously, it 
expands, from the Russian perspective, the borders of the Russian state beyond their politically-manifested 
geographies. Putin made this explicit in his Crimea acceptance speech when he drew specific attention to the 
Russian people as a ‘divided nation’, heralding reunification with the peninsula as a healing step towards the 
reunification of the Russian nation itself (Putin 2014). Within this vision of the Russian nation, Russian speakers 
appear as key boundary markers that are located beyond its political borders.  
Putin’s adroit political manoeuvring has provided the latitude to start taking a more assertive stance 
towards Russia’s compatriots. This, according to Nozhenko (2006), became especially evident from 2002 
onwards, when compatriots were seen as potential resources rather than burdens. It also expanded the institutional, 
abstract, and territorial space over which the Russian state has been able to claim some form of moral, spiritual 
and institutional jurisdiction. This affords Russia a wider range of ethno-cultural and institutional mechanisms 
that can be selectively enforced to interact with, and potentially influence, ‘diasporic’ groups. For example, while 
Crimean residents, a majority of whom were ethnic Russians, were portrayed as an integral part of Russia’s 
‘divided nation’, this rhetoric was not apparent for Ossetians and Abkhaz. In all three cases, however, Russia 
employed the tactic of ‘passportisation’ (Natoli 2010), offering (in the Crimean case, eventually enforcing) full 
Russian citizenship.  
  
 
 
11 
Aside from ‘passportisation’ and ‘repatriation’ of Russian compatriots, official policy has focused 
heavily on cultural diplomacy. At times this is conducted relatively benignly, as an effort to promote Russian 
language and literature. In other instances, culture is used to assert Russia’s special status as the only state willing 
to protect Russian culture and the civilisational values associated with Russianness (Cheskin 2016, p. 174-78). 
Not dissimilar to other European states, Russia’s cultural diplomacy has consequently been viewed as both an 
apolitical, cultural project and as a soft power strategy with post-colonial overtones (Gorham 2011, p. 25-6). 
The admixture of cultural and political diplomacy offers compatriots a type of ideational citizenship, 
extending a political identity and a form of membership with the Russian Federation, even if it is often largely 
symbolic. Scholars of citizenship often distinguish three dimensions of citizenship: political (republican), juridical 
(liberal) and membership (identity-based) (see Cohen 1999). These approaches to citizenship can be usefully 
linked to conceptual approaches to borders, whereby Russia’s citizenship policies should be seen simultaneously 
as bordering practices.  Russia’s approach to its compatriots can be placed, to varying degrees, along all three of 
these citizenship axes. The Russian state, therefore, participates in bordering practices through the expansion of 
its political, legal and ideational citizenship. 
The selective and partial implementation of these dimensions, however, leads to a form of ‘fuzzy’, quasi-
citizenship (Fowler 2002). Quasi-citizenship is most commonly offered to compatriots as a form of joint identity 
with the Russian Federation, accompanied by a limited package of institutionalised channels for political and 
cultural engagement. For Agarin and Karolewski (2015, p. 5), this is best characterised as a form of extraterritorial 
citizenship, i.e. a range of institutional and symbolic practices ‘connecting the citizens of host states to their kin-
states’. Russia has established a number of institutionalised channels to project its extraterritorial citizenship, such 
as the International Coordinating Council for Russian Compatriots Living Abroad (established in 2007). However, 
the Russian state has also attempted to institutionalise its citizenship practices in more ideational and civilisational 
terms.  
The ‘Russian World’ 
Agarin and Karolewski (2015, p. 9) argue that symbolic forms of extraterritorial citizenship should be 
viewed as politically-institutionalised forms of citizenship practices. One area wherein this institutionalisation is 
clearly apparent is Russia’s symbolic appeal to the concept of Russkii mir (the Russian World). The concept 
entered Russia’s mainstream political vocabulary in 2001 with President Putin’s declaration that ‘The notion of 
the Russian World extends far from Russia’s geographical borders and even far from the borders of the Russian 
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ethnicity’ (as cited in Laruelle 2015, p. 6). It was further enshrined as a key component of Russia’s cultural 
diplomacy in 2007 with the creation of the Russkiy mir foundation. 
The Russian World plays a significant discursive function, allowing Russian authorities to ‘soften’ its 
existing territorial borders. The contours of the Russian world are ill-defined, but are implicitly understood to 
extend to territories historically constituting the Soviet Union and Russian empire. Feklyunina (2015, p. 11) notes 
that the Russian World is ‘imagined as a naturally existing civilisational community’ embodying a set of ‘Russian’ 
spiritual and moral values, and based on visions of a common history. The Russian Orthodox Church is a keen 
advocate for the Russian World and consequently plays an active role within the Russkii mir foundation and sets 
the concept at the heart of its image for a reimagined and transformed Russia (Wawrzonek 2014, p. 762). In many 
respects the Russian World concept goes hand in hand with compatriot policy. Indeed, as stated by Anatolii 
Makarov, Director of the Department for Compatriots Abroad (Ministry of Foreign Affairs),  
In order to meet its main objectives, the multidimensional Russian World beyond Russia is based firmly 
on compatriots. The main goals are, first and foremost, strengthening ties with the historical homeland 
and the preservation of the Russian civilisational space (language, culture, national customs and 
traditions). (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2013b) 
 
The Russian World therefore encapsulates ‘a supra-national or civilisational-level tier of identity’ 
(Hudson 2015, p. 7), offering compatriots ideational citizenship that can link their personal identities with those 
of the Russian state. Despite its ostensibly transnational character, however, the Russian World paradoxically 
promotes ‘the nationalist aims of the state’ (Gorham 2011, p. 29). To this extent, the Russian ‘diaspora’ holds a 
prominent place in defining contemporary Russian national identity, and overcoming Russia’s widely-accepted 
difficulty of defining the membership and spatial confines of the Russian nation (Shevel 2012, p. 113).  
For a number of nationalist schools in Russia, the collapse of the USSR was responsible for the division 
of the Russian nation (Laruelle 2015), dispersing Russians among fifteen newly-constituted, independent 
countries. The strategy of creating an expanded spiritual and civilisational space for Russianness (russkost’) 
therefore somewhat allays the concerns of various nationalist groups. Indeed, as Kozin (2015) notes, President 
Putin has increasingly conceptualised compatriots as a natural continuation of the Russian nation, attempting to 
redress previously prevalent feelings that Russians in Russia represented ‘the other Russia’ (Komarskaya 2005, 
p. 269).  
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The developments in Crimea and Donbas have notably propelled the Russian World concept directly into 
the realm of geopolitics; symbolically and institutionally it provides a platform and pattern for identification that 
is, in many respects, in direct competition with ‘the West’ and Europe (Wawrzonek 2014). While Russia’s policy 
proffers a relatively fluid, ‘fuzzy’ definition of Russian compatriots, it simultaneously draws clear dividing lines 
between this imagined community and the non-Russian ‘other’, demanding that ‘real Russians’ respect their 
civilisational, cultural, linguistic and historical traditions (Cheskin 2016, p. 174-81). Borders between Russia and 
non-Russia are therefore drawn along civilisational lines, with Russian ‘compatriots’ supposedly representing 
bastions of ‘Russianness’.   
Bordering practices of the ‘nationalising states’ 
Surveying the recent evolution of Russia’s compatriot policies, it is possible to see how the boundaries 
of Russianness have been symbolically expanded beyond the country’s post-Soviet political-territorial borders. 
Equally important to the status of Russian speakers are the corresponding bordering practices enacted by, and 
within, the fourteen other successor states of the USSR. There is considerable variance in terms of how language, 
ethnicity, territory and history are constructed as practical bordering modalities within these states. We argue that 
grasping the porousness of these practices is key to understanding general trends in Russian-speaking identities; 
when symbolic borders are constructed non-porously, they can serve to essentialise communities by creating stark 
divisions between ‘them’ and ‘us’. Alternatively, when borders are porous, individuals are more able to order their 
symbolic identities according to their own personal preferences, and complex, nuanced and even multiple 
identities can be accommodated. 
For the sake of conceptual clarity, and following Brubaker’s (1998) influential work, we use the blanket-
term ‘nationalising states’ to describe these fourteen states. By this we mean that these states have sought to 
(re)define the core national self through a series of state and nation-building measures. Such efforts are crucial in 
understanding how external and internal borders between ‘us’ and ‘them’ are enacted in relation to Russian-
speaking minority groups in the FSU.  
Latvia and Estonia1 
                                                          
1 This special issue focuses on the five states covered in this section. It is with regret that we have not been able 
to cover Moldova, an under-researched country with a large Russian-speaking population and its own particular 
internal dynamics.  
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Within the fourteen states in question, nation-building has been pursued with varying degrees of 
intensity. For the Baltic states, especially Latvia and Estonia, there was a clear delineation between the ‘core 
nations’ (i.e. ethnic Latvians and Estonians respectively) and the Russian/Soviet ‘other’ (Smith et al. 1998, p. 99). 
These states, which have previously been labelled militant democracies (Ijabs 2016) or ethnic democracies (Smith 
1996), purposely excluded large sections of Russian speakers from obtaining Latvian and Estonian citizenship. 
As such, internal borders have been created that have demarcated the eponymous ethnic group from the non-
Latvian/Estonian ‘other’.  
Paradoxically, this bordering practice has at least some potential to reinforce historico-cultural borders 
(such as the ‘Russian world’) by depicting Russophone minority groups as symbolically bound with Russians in 
the Russian Federation. Indeed, in the Baltic contexts, historico-cultural borders are constantly reinforced by 
political actors who instrumentalise historical interpretations of the past in order to mobilise ethnicised electoral 
support (Cheskin and March 2016).  
Socially transmitted ‘memories’ of the Second World War and its aftermath stand out as crucial bordering 
practices (Cheskin 2016, pp. 129-48). This is particularly noticeable for Russian speakers who are often depicted 
as ‘occupiers’, i.e. people whose presence in the Baltic states was facilitated by the Soviet occupation in 1944 and 
subsequent Sovietisation. Indeed, Estonia’s and Latvia’s stringent citizenship laws were openly premised on the 
notion of legal continuity: only Latvian and Estonian citizens from before the Soviet occupation and their direct 
descendants were eligible for post-Soviet citizenship. While latterly mitigated by the formulation of 
‘naturalisation’ processes, this policy has aided the symbolic erection of a historical boundary, reinforced with 
politically-institutionalised citizenship practices that have been securitised (Kachuyevski 2016), rendering this 
border non-porous as well.    
For Kachuyevski and Olesker (2014), these bordering practices on the part of the majority can be 
conceptualised in terms of an ‘L’ identity boundary (see figure 1). According to this logic, titulars in Latvia and 
Estonia largely lump Russophone minorities together with Russians in the supposed kin-state of Russia, 
essentially rejecting their legitimate membership in the collective ‘we’, even as minorities may not accept this 
boundary. Latvian and Estonian citizenship practices therefore ironically have overlapping functions with the 
varieties of Russia’s extraterritorial citizenship discussed above. In both cases there is a discursive incongruence 
between existing politico-territorial and historico-cultural borders; Russian speakers are undeniably physically 
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located beyond Russia’s political borders, and yet a symbolic border is erected that encompasses both the Russian 
state and Russian speakers.  
Despite clear demarcation between ethnic Estonians/Latvians on the one hand and ‘Russian speakers’ on 
the other, it is important to note that these relatively non-porous bordering practices are primarily visible in the 
political realm. For example, ethnographic scholarship in the border regions of Latvia (Lulle 2016) and Estonia 
(Pfoser 2015) has shown how even the political border with Russia is more securitised in Latvian and Estonian 
political discourse than in the everyday practices of the people who dwell in these regions. Likewise, numerous 
authors have reported how lived experiences and interactions in the Baltic states are far less ethnicised and rigidly 
demarked than the political rhetoric suggests (Cheskin 2016, pp. 118-9; 154; Lulle and Jurkane-Hobein 2017, p. 
607). The non-porous, politically-imagined borders therefore do not necessarily map onto socially-practised 
borders of everyday existence. This means that the top-down boundary making practices of the respective Russian, 
Estonian and Latvian states are not necessarily accepted by Latvia’s and Estonia’s Russian speakers themselves.  
Another complicating factor is Latvia’s and Estonia’s membership, since 2004, of the European Union. 
A body of scholars have suggested that globalisation has the potential to erode Westphalian notions of citizenship 
(e.g. Smith and Bakker 2008), especially when political entities such as the EU offer a form of transnational 
governance and citizenship (Balibar 2004). In this context, borders can acquire ‘a spatiality beyond territoriality’ 
(Rumford 2006, p. 160). For some Russian speakers, especially those who take advantage of the EU’s free 
movement of trade and people, the openness of Europe’s internal borders helps to mitigate their sense of alienation 
from the Latvian state (Lulle and Jurkane-Hobein 2017). Additionally, research among Latvia’s Russian-speaking 
migrants in London (Lulle and Jurkane-Hobein 2017, p. 606) corroborates Cheskin’s assumption that Russian 
speakers can conceptualise their ‘Europeanised’ status ‘as a factor that differentiates them from Russians [in 
Russia]’ (Cheskin 2015, p. 84). As Aptekar (2009) has documented, Russia’s bordering practices and claims of 
stewardship over Russian speakers are significantly diminished as a result of economic opportunities within the 
EU.   
Ukraine 
Significantly, each of the fourteen ‘nationalising states’ has differed in its nation-building approach. 
Ukraine, for example, has been forced to deal with a historically more porous and mixed set of symbolic and 
‘actual’ borders that exist between Ukraine and Russia: von Hagen, writing in 1995, famously referred to the 
‘fluidity of frontiers, the permeability of cultures’ associated with Ukraine (1995, p. 670). The porousness of these 
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borders can be seen in terms of linguistic (Kulyk 2015; 2016), ethnic (Fournier 2002), historical (Rodgers 2007) 
and territorial bordering processes. For Ukraine these have often been subject to contestation, heated debate and 
even armed conflict (for the case of Donbas) and annexation (for the case of Crimea).  
Before the upheavals of the ‘Orange Revolution’ in 2004 and the ‘Maidan’ in 2013/4, a number of 
scholars preferred to delineate social cleavages along the three main ethno-linguistic groups in Ukraine: 
Ukrainophone Ukrainians, Russophone Ukrainians, and Russophone Russians (Arel and Khmelko 1996). Recent 
scholarship, however, has preferred to view identity cleavages in terms of regional and socio-economic, rather 
than ethno-linguistic, differences (e.g. Kulyk 2016; Portnov 2015, p. 730). The complexity of these categories 
highlights the extent that Ukraine’s cultural, linguistic, ethnic and even territorial boundaries have often spilt over 
into one another (Fournier 2002, pp. 418-20).   
Compared to Latvia and Estonia, Ukraine is striking for the way in which symbolic internal and external 
borders are not always rigidly constructed. This is evidenced in the way that a number of people who previously 
identified themselves as ‘Russians’ have more recently opted to self-identify as ‘Ukrainians’ (Romaniuk and 
Gladun 2015, p. 324). In terms of Ukraine’s internal borders, this renders the term ‘Russian speakers’ somewhat 
redundant as an identity marker within certain contexts (although we do not fully discount the continued salience 
of language for many Ukrainians). This is especially evident in post-Maidan Ukraine where, despite the 
persistence of core cultural and ethnic ‘Ukrainian’ values, national identity is increasingly conceptualised in civic 
terms (Yekelchyk 2015; Kulyk 2016; see also the contributions by Kulyk and Bureiko and Moga in this volume).  
Unlike Latvia and Estonia, Ukraine’s internal borders can therefore be conceptualised in terms of a ‘T’ 
identity boundary (see figure 1). Here, Russian speakers are not strictly delineated as symbolic members of the 
Russian nation, and they themselves do not self identify as such. Instead, they are often perceived and self identify 
as an integral part of the Ukrainian (civic) nation, not least because of the very large number of Russian speaking 
Ukrainians. This is despite a number of radical Ukrainian voices who still view Russian culture and language in 
post-colonial terms and who would therefore prefer to adopt a more ‘Baltic’ model of boundary creation 
(Yekelchyk 2015, p. 99). The relative porousness of Ukraine’s internal bordering practices therefore provides 
greater latitude for Russian speakers to feel included within the ‘Ukrainian’ national space, even when certain 
other symbolic and historical boundaries may still overlap.      
Kazakhstan 
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Other FSU states have adopted more ambiguous bordering and nation-building practices. Kazakhstan, 
for example, has introduced a limited programme of nation-building to entrench feelings of pride in ethnic Kazakh 
identity (Beacháin and Kevlihan 2013). At the same time, the Kazakhstani authorities have been careful not to 
alienate their large ethnic Russian population. Russian, for example, continues to be designated as an official 
language ‘used on equal grounds along with the Kazakh language’ (Constitution of Kazakhstan, Article 7.2). This 
results in a somewhat paradoxical situation whereby ‘officially Kazakhstan is both a multicultural state and a 
nation-state for the Kazakhs’ (Holm-Hansen 1999, p. 165).  
The borders of Russianness in Kazakhstan are therefore not always clear-cut. Language, for example, 
sometimes delineates socioeconomic borders more than ethnic and national ones: Russian are more likely to have 
relatively high levels of education and inhabit relatively more prosperous urban spaces even for individuals who 
self-identify as ethnic Kazakhs. Linguistic borders are therefore relatively porous. However, the country’s 
asymmetrical bilingualism (Kazakhstan’s ethnic Russians rarely speak Kazakh, while highly-educated ethnic 
Kazakhs commonly speak Russian and often more fluently than Kazakh) means that there are limits to the 
porousness of this linguistic border. Indeed, previous research conducted by Lowell Barrington has highlighted 
unease among many ethnic Russians about the public use of the Kazakh language (Barrington 2001, p. 137). 
Barrington also reported on the sharpness of the ethnic divide, demonstrated by, for example, the infrequency of 
interethnic marriages between Russians and Kazakhs (Barrington 2001, p. 132).   
Kazakhstan therefore presents an interesting case study of a country that has rather tentatively introduced 
‘cautious and astute’ bordering and nation-building practices (Zardykhan 2004, p. 61) that are designed to 
introduce ‘Kazakhisation’, but simultaneously avoid aggravating the native Russian-speaking population or 
(perhaps more importantly) the Russian Federation. As part of Kazakhstan’s ‘multi-vector foreign policy’ 
(Ambrosio and Lange 2014, p. 543), there is a constant need to maintain a certain level of fluidity in Kazakhstan’s 
borders (understood in the broad sense). This helps to prevent Kazakhstan becoming the ‘other’ for Russia and 
for Kazakhstan’s large ethnic Russian population (Ambrosio and Lange 2014, p. 548). 
One mechanism through which the Nazarbayev regime has maintained an astute level of porousness in 
its bordering practices is through the country’s membership of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Sharing 
some similarities with the EU’s transnational approach to internal borders, the EEU ‘softens’ Kazakhstan’s land 
border with Russia (the largest continuous land border on earth), allowing free movement of people, goods and 
services within a unified economic space. The project also has symbolic value, stressing the importance of the 
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concept of Eurasia as a meaningful, transnational concept, geopolitically signifying that Kazakhstan is not an 
enemy to Russia.   
As a result of these complexities, it is more difficult to categorise Kazakhstan’s internal nation-building 
and bordering practices in terms of either an ‘L’ or ‘T’ identity boundary; on the one hand, boundaries are 
sometimes explicitly maintained, while in other areas they are purposefully downplayed. This is consequently 
reflected in the multifaceted ways that Kazakhstan’s ethnic Russians relate to both Kazakhstan and Russia in 
political, symbolic and cultural terms (see contribution by Jasina in this volume).    
Belarus 
Belarus stands out among the non-Russian FSU states because of the general dominance of Russian, 
despite equal constitutional status with Belarusian (Lilja and Starzhynskaya 2015); survey data even suggests that 
everyday use of Russian has generally been increasing, while use of Belarusian has been decreasing (Kittel et al. 
2010). This is despite the fact that, as census data attests, the proportion of the country’s self-declared ethnic 
Belarusians has been rising (Woolhiser 2014, p. 83). In this context, both the Russian language and the ‘titular’ 
language do not function as bordering modalities in the ways that can be seen in many other FSU states (although 
there are some similarities with Ukraine). Tellingly, ‘trasianka’, a mixed variant combining elements of Russian 
and Belarusian is also widely spoken: more so than Belarusian itself (Kittel et al. 2010).  
Internal borders, especially linguistic borders, therefore appear more fluid than any of the other FSU 
states in terms of demarcating ‘Russian’ and national (i.e. ‘Belarusian’) spaces. Ethnic borders between Russians 
and Belarusians are fairly non-salient with Bekus (2014, p. 50) categorising ethnic Belarusians as a ‘cold ethnic 
group’, i.e. a group accepting their ethnic categorisation as Belarusians, but for whom this category lacks 
emotional significance. 
Just as for Ukraine, many people consider Belarus’s past in terms of a common history with Russia. 
Unlike Ukraine, however, there have only been limited attempts to forcibly separate Belarusian and Russian 
historiographies. In the early 90s there were notable efforts to establish a distinctly Belarusian historiography, 
anchored in notions of European civilisation. Since President Lukašenka’s first term in office, however, this 
process has been largely reversed, with history textbooks instead highlighting historical links with Russia (Zadora 
2015). Politically, Belarus operates as a founding member of the EEU (like Kazakhstan) and operates with a 
relatively open border with Russia, further reinforcing the fluidity of Belarusian/Russian borders. 
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Despite the seeming cultural, linguistic and even political closeness of Belarus and Russia, Belarusians 
nevertheless often have complex relationships with Russia (see Fabrykant’s contribution to this volume). 
Belarusian nation-building is commonly studied in relation to the state ideology (Bekus 2014, p. 56) and 
authoritarianism of the country’s long-standing president, Aliaksandr Lukašenka (Burkhardt 2016). Lukašenka’s 
political strategy has been to facilitate political independence without rupturing possibilities for trade and 
cooperation with partners in the EU and Russia, with the pragmatic emphasis on relations with Russia. In this 
respect, the political imperative has been to avoid the erection of non-porous borders (Korosteleva 2015, p. 111), 
thereby preserving the notion of Belarus as an (independent) borderland (Lija and Starzhynskaya 2015, p. 248). 
In relation to Russia, this leads to policies that create and propagate the ‘softest’ possible borders that can 
simultaneously foster state independence. Conceptually, this makes it very difficult to study ‘Russian speakers’ 
from either ‘L’ or ‘T’ identity perspectives since indeed national identity is not heavily contested. Whereas for 
Kazakhstan, it is possible to derive generalised trends in both ‘L’ and ‘T’ directions along a number of axes, for 
Belarus, there is a pervasive sense of ambiguity and ‘in between-ness’ that often defies neat categorisation. 
Interestingly, despite commonly-held opinions that Belarusians and Russians (alongside Ukrainians) constitute a 
single nation (Woolhiser 2014, p. 89), the most prevalent models of Belarusian national identity stress 
independence from Russia. For President Lukašenka’s state programme, this is often categorised as a form of 
‘Creole nationalism’ (Woolhiser 2014, p. 89), with emphasis on Belarus’s Soviet past and links with Russia, but 
increasingly a focus on Belarusian sovereignty.   
Framework for Analysis 
The complex international and domestic factors discussed above present a thorny array of issues to 
consider when conceptualising Russian-speaking identities and practices. When discussing the role of the Russian 
Federation it is important to disaggregate conceptually the term ‘Russia’ along a number of salient axes: linguistic, 
cultural, economic, historical, ethnic and political. As noted earlier, porousness of group boundaries may be tied 
to more fluid, nuanced and non-exclusive identities. It is therefore a centrally important issue when examining 
inter and intra-group relations between Russian-speakers and ‘titular groups’. States in the Post-Soviet space can 
be categorised according to the axes noted above, and according to any contestation of the borders as well as their 
porous or non-porous nature. This allows us to examine how bordering practices interact with nation-building and 
with relations with Russia.  
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Above, we have surveyed bordering practices of five key FSU ‘nationalising states’ in relation to how 
Russian speakers are positioned vis-à-vis their state of residence and various incarnations of Russia/the ‘Russian 
World’. We also examined the bordering practices of Russia as a potentially diasporising kin-state. These are all 
summarised in table 1. The conclusions for our variegated model are that, perhaps unsurprisingly, it is hardly 
possible to talk of a unified Russian diaspora in the post-Soviet space; the disparate internal conditions of each 
separate state lead to a wide range of possible reactions to Russia’s diasporising policies. However, by viewing 
the porousness of various boundaries, it becomes possible to understand various trends identified in the extant 
literatures.   
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
Table 1: Internal and External Bordering Practices in Selected Post-Soviet States Contributions to the Issue 
  
 
The articles of this special issue present a series of empirical case studies across a number of key FSU states.  
These contributions illustrate how the lived experiences of Russophones in post-Soviet countries both reflect and 
shape bordering processes in the context of nationalising states and Russian activism. In the Baltic states, concern 
about maintaining their culture and sovereignty in the context of Russia’s asserted status as an external homeland 
for their Russophone populations has led to the construction of fairly rigid and non-porous borders. Yet, the three 
contributing articles demonstrate that Russophones possess complex identities that may not always warrant the 
concerns of governments in the Baltic states. Kaprans and Mierina’s analysis, for example, reveals that 
Russophone identity involves a complex socio-cognitive process, wherein there is significant consensus on 
belonging to Latvia, even as there is noticeable in-group differentiation, primarily related to citizenship status and 
age. They identify three clusters of Russophone identity in Latvia: Compatriots; Critical Moderates; and, European 
Russians. Amongst these groups, only the Compatriots fit with the expectations that underscore both Latvian and 
Russian bordering practices. Vihalemm, Juzefovics and Leppik also posit several identity categories in Latvia and 
Estonia: ethnocultural; civic; diasporic; and, transnational, with only the diasporic category (which is 
characterized by Soviet nostalgia and attachment to Russian neoimperial views) being consistent with Baltic and 
Russian bordering practices. Analyzing media consumption patterns, they argue that, in a time of political conflict 
and a corresponding media war, part of the Russian-speaking population has demonstrated an ability to maintain 
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transnational ‘in-between-ness, reflecting their multidimensional and complex identities. Ekmanis, in turn, finds 
that Russophone youth demonstrate a distinct connection to Latvia and to expressions of Latvian state culture 
(evidenced by participation in events directly linked to Latvian cultural identity), while at the same time they 
maintain their identity as Russian speakers and as members of a minority group. 
Kazakhstan and Belarus, in contrast, have largely porous borders along the most salient axes. In her 
analysis of Russian speaking youth in Kazakhstan, Jasina finds that the concept of “rodina” (homeland) does not 
reflect a clearly bounded entity. Rather, there is no consistent internal or external homeland for these youth. 
Instead, ‘rodina’ is a flexible concept that is multi-layered and highly context related as patterns of belonging are 
local, national and transnational in nature. Despite the relatively porous borders, in her contribution Fabrykant 
argues that Russian bordering practices, particularly the Russian World strategy, has backfired in Belarus, leading 
to a new Belarusian nationalism that rejects Russian neoconservative and neoimperial policies while maintaining 
a Russophone identity.  
Finally, and not surprisingly, the two contributions on Ukraine illustrate how on-going conflict with 
Russia (which has rendered a number of borders, material and symbolic contested) has increased attachment to 
Ukraine amongst Russian speakers. Bureiko and Moga argue that language choice and usage is politicised, but is 
not correlated to Ukrainian identity or attachment to Ukraine. Instead, Ukrainian identity has taken a civic turn, 
wherein expressed desire to protect Ukraine from aggression has become more salient in the wake of the 
annexation of Crimea and war in Donbas. In his contribution, Kulyk notes that Russian speakers have developed 
a salient Ukrainian identity even as they maintain attachment to the Russian language. Indeed, he finds that 
Russian speakers identify themselves as Ukrainians more strongly than they do as Russian speakers, although 
regional identity remains stronger still. He argues that there are no clear boundaries between Russian speaking 
Ukrainians and the rest of Ukraine’s population, leading to the conclusion that regional differences exist but are 
not driven by language usage or practice as all groups agree that Russian speakers constitute a legitimate part of 
the Ukrainian nation.  
 
 The overriding conclusion from these studies, and our framework for analysis, is that Russian-speaking 
identities are complex within each polity where Russian speakers are concentrated. As demonstrated in the 
empirical sections of this special issue, it is difficult enough trying to pin-point clusters of Russian-speakers’ 
identities in Latvia and Estonia. Attempts to talk, therefore, of transnational Russian/Russian-speaking identities 
are even more problematic. Despite the obvious and enduring diversity among people whose first language is 
Russian, ‘Russian-speakers’ nonetheless continue to be essentialised from many quarters. The politicised ‘reality’ 
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of ‘Russians’ and/or ‘Russian-speakers’ is consequently likely to persist, irrespective of the manifest complexity 
and diversity of the millions of people who continue to speak Russian outside of the Russian Federation in places 
that were once part of the Soviet Union.  
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Table 1: Summary of Internal and External Bordering Practices  
Internal Dynamics External Dynamics 
Kazakhstan Latvia and Estonia Ukraine Belarus Russia 
Political 
borders 
Relatively porous  
Member of CIS and EEU; 
open border with Russia and 
many Kazakhstanis seeking 
work in Russia. 
Relatively non-porous  
EU member; relatively 
closed physical border and 
strict visa controls towards 
Russia; greater ease of 
access to Russia for 
individuals with non-citizen 
passports.  
Contested 
Non-porous for areas under 
Ukrainian governmental 
control; contested for areas 
no longer under Ukrainian 
governmental control 
(Crimea and large parts of 
the Donbas).  
Relatively porous 
Member of CIS and EEU; 
open border with Russia; 
political emphasis on 
Belarusian state sovereignty.  
Relatively 
porous/expansionist 
Member of CIS and EEU; 
political and military 
interference in neighbouring  
areas such as Donbas, 
Crimea, Transnistria, South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia, often 
accompanied by 
‘passportisation’. 
Language 
borders 
Largely porous 
Russian language not 
explicitly linked to ethnicity; 
Russian constitutionally 
recognised as language of 
interethnic communication. 
Some limited efforts to 
reduce the influence of 
Russian. 
Largely non-porous 
Language legislation to 
prevent public dominance of 
Russian; moniker ‘Russian-
speaker’ used as designation 
for group identity and highly 
politicised; everyday, social 
use of Russian more fluid 
and less politicised.  
Largely porous  
Russian seen as a non-issue 
for many Ukrainians and 
speaking Russian not 
explicitly linked to 
political/territorial ties with 
Russia; widespread 
bilingualism; some moves for 
further Ukrainianisation.  
Porous  
Fluid but with general 
predominance of Russian 
language alongside limited 
use of Belarusian and 
widespread use of mixed 
language (trasianka). 
Porous and expansionist 
Russian language 
symbolising extended border 
beyond political territory of 
Russian Federation; Russian 
speakers at times 
conceptualised as extension 
of Russian nation.   
Ethnic 
borders 
Non-porous 
Ethnicity conceptualised in 
largely dichotomous terms. 
Non-porous 
Rigid and institutionalised 
ideas concerning ethnicity.  
Porous 
Ethnic self-designation 
increasingly seen as matter 
of personal choice 
irrespective of parents’ 
ethnicity or language. 
Relatively non-porous but 
non-salient 
Prevalent Soviet 
understandings of ethnicity, 
but ethnicity largely non-
politicised and ‘cold’.  
Contradictory 
Increased conflation of civic 
and ethnic ideas of 
Russianness, but with 
implicit focus on Russian 
ethnic core. 
Historical 
borders 
Porous 
Weak sense of pre-Soviet 
stateness and historical 
concentration of ethnic 
Russians in north of country.  
Non-porous 
Clear emphasis in Latvian 
and Estonian 
historiographies on the 
injustices of Soviet 
occupation.  
Contested 
Ongoing territorial disputes 
tied to historical claims; 
difficulty of separating 
Ukrainian and Russian 
historiography.   
Largely porous 
Generally overlapping 
historical memories with 
periodic and limited efforts 
to create a distinct 
Belarusian historiography.  
Expansionist 
Historical claims to greater 
influence in Eurasian region 
based on Soviet and imperial 
experiences.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Collective 
 Identity 
(State B) 
                 Minority 
                  Identity 
                 (State A)  
 
 
Majority 
Identity 
(State A) 
 
 
Minority 
Identity 
(State A) 
 
Majority 
Identity 
(State A) 
 
 T Configuration 
Internal division between perceived  
majority and minority identities 
L Configuration 
Majority projection of minority 
 as an external other 
          Figure 1: ‘T’ and ‘L’ Configuration Models for Divisions in Perceived Identities within Divided Societies 
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